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MEMORANDUM

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the UN for spectacular disarmament proposals and similar neo-liberal manifestations, but under this hypothesis they would not be aimed at responsible Western policy-makers or even at influential opinion groups in the Western countries.

Reasons:

Apart from the internal and historic arguments against a return to the tone and pattern of Soviet diplomacy in the Litvinoff era, such a strategy would be pointless in the absence of a popular-front strategy at the mass level, and popular fronts cannot be created for the reason indicated in Paragraph 1. The Rapallo—or Molotov-Ribbentrop—pattern of diplomacy is perfectly compatible, however, with a program of tough aggressive nationalism and encouragement of intensified class warfare in bourgeois countries, because it appeals to the short-term self-interest of dominant cliques in the target countries and does not require the pressure or support of public opinion. Conversely, in countries like France or the U.K. where public opinion is influential and basically anti-communist the Rapallo approach either is not feasible or must be limited to the economic field so that it does not appear to imply a total reorientation of national policy.

3. Unless the speech is part of a major deception-plan, the Kremlin is not at present thinking in terms of general hot war, but localized aggressions of various types, flagrant enough to create a risk of Western military reactions as in Korea, remain permissive, and an intensification of such limited aggression is probably foreshadowed. While the actions already launched in Indo-China and Korea will probably continue, the aggressive pattern favored for the future appears to be as follows: The 'fraternal party'—supported by the 'democratic', workers' and peasants' parties—of a given country will emulate their Russian comrades of a generation ago and attempt to seize power by force. The revolutionaries must not count on the Red Army to hand them victory on a silver platter—Stalin is brutally explicit on this point. If they show sufficient promise, however, the USSR will "render them support and also support their peoples in their struggle for liberation". This, of course, will arouse the Western powers, but the USSR, counting on the new 'shock brigades' from China to Czechoslovakia, will be bolder in supporting revolution than it has considered prudent in the past ("New matters are very different"). As an extra precaution against direct military retaliation, the fraternal parties everywhere outside the affected area, in accordance with the principle of 'mutual support' will organize vigorous and when necessary violent 'hands off Russia' campaigns. Obviously this pattern can only

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be applied easily along the Soviet periphery, preferably the southern and southeastern periphery, with Iran as the most logical next victim and Yugoslavia as a possible candidate.

Reason:

If deception is ruled out, emphasis on preparation for hot war seems to be excluded by omission. It was precisely the expectation of military attack which led to the popular front policy of the '30's. Similarly if Stalin expected general war in the near future it seems most unlikely that he would lay down a party line calculated to alienate liberal and pacifistic bourgeois elements whose service in weakening the Western will-to-resist would be invaluable. Even the instructions to hard-core militants do not subordinate all other considerations to the defense of the USSR as would be required in case of war. True, the Thorez-Togliatti doctrine of primary allegiance to the USSR is reaffirmed, and Stalin explicitly warns that it would be erroneous to suppose that the Party no longer needs the support of world communism. He does not elaborate on the need for support, however. Instead, he boasts about what the Russian party has achieved without help in the past, and there is an undertone of confident pride bordering on arrogance in his declaration that the Russian party cannot be indebted to the 'fraternal parties'. The same note is apparent in his sharp reminder to the members of these fraternal parties that their task today is incomparably easier than that which the early Russian Bolsheviks laid upon themselves. All this supports the conclusion that in Stalin's eyes the primary current mission of the communist parties outside the Iron Curtain is neither preparation for hot war, nor merely the kind of cold-war fifth-column activity with which Marty and Tillon were particularly identified in France, but something else. What? Not popular fronts, diplomatic peace offensives, etc. What then? Simply to resume the original communist mission of organizing and supporting violent revolution. Neither socialism in one country, nor world-revolution all at once, but world-revolution step-by-step, in country after country, beginning at the periphery and working out, with the more distant communist parties running interference for the current ball-carrier of the revolution while preparing their own.

4. While seeking to undermine the U.S. system of alliances by Rapallo methods as suggested in Paragraph 2, Soviet psychological strategy (in the broad sense) will rely heavily, if not predominantly, upon the pattern of indirect aggression by revolution postulated in Paragraph 4.

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Reasons:

Largely corollary to the conclusions of Paragraph 4, but reenforced by the emphasis on the revolutionary theme of personal freedom and national independence in the speech.

5. This revolutionary strategy will probably be mainly directed at—and in any case have its greatest effect upon—the Asian countries, especially those of the southern periphery, and Africa, with Latin America as a significant secondary target. A negative exception may be Japan, which offers a promising target for the Rapalle approach. A positive exception, of great moment to us, might be Yugoslavia. If the hypothesis is correct as to the pattern and main direction of the Soviet psychological attack, local revolutionary activity will probably be supported by great emphasis in the UN and other international forums on anti-colonial themes, anti-racialism, defense of human rights, etc.

Reasons:

With the possible exception of Yugoslavia, no European country seems highly vulnerable at this time to revolutionary attack. The new line should strengthen the communist position in France and Italy, but not decisively. The under-developed areas, particularly in Asia, are on the contrary highly vulnerable to the revolutionary strategy postulated, and decisive results may be achieved in these areas with a minimum of risk. The long-term menace to India, which would be a major prize in the world struggle, seems particularly acute. This deductive argument is strengthened and clarified by another chain of reasoning from the premise in the speech to support 'all Communist, democratic, worker's or peasants' parties' which have not yet come to power and which continue to work under the heel of Draconic bourgeois laws'. In Europe this formula has little relevance. Almost certainly it does not include the socialists—except for a few left wingers of the Menni type—and there remain only a few unimportant splinter-groups, most of which are violently anti-Stalinist. Yet the frequent references in the speech to revolutionary elements other than orthodox Stalinists does not seem to be purely rhetorical. There is no reason why it should be if one keeps Asia and Africa in mind. In most of the Asian and African countries or territories, organized Stalinism is surrounded by numerically larger groups with a vaguely Marxist but fiercely nationalist and frequently anti-white orientation. In terms of Stalinist dogma many of these groups are given over to the blackest forms of heresy, but their organizational ties with international Trotskyism, Titoism, etc. are slight. Therefore they can be accepted as revolutionary allies, and in

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some countries they can be very useful allies. Probably the Tudeh party in Iran represents the Kremlin's ideal of a happy association of Stalinist and non-Stalinist revolutionary elements, but we should not be too surprised if many of General Naguib's followers are discovered by the communists to be solid democrats, or even to see the North African nationalist leaders classified as non-bourgeois elements.

As to the possibility that Yugoslavia might be judged a major target, while it seems inconceivable that Tite himself could ever be accepted back into the fold, it is undeniable that most of his followers are workers or peasants, even if they are not democrats in the eyes of the Kremlin. And if, as postulated, the Communist line gives the appearance of veering back to Leninism, at least in its external policies, is it impossible that this might have some influence on men who like to think of themselves as true Leninists?

6. In Western Europe no basic change in communist activity is likely but the communist parties will be freed to some extent from unpopular fifth-column duties and will give greater emphasis to mass agitation in support of working class interests. Propaganda will be noticeably more idealistic (in proletarian terms) harking back to some of the successful themes of the '20's. U.S. imperialism and war-mongering will continue to be heavily exploited but agitation in support of these themes will be less artificial and more opportunistic in terms of local conditions. Party morale and popularity should gradually rise. Anti-communism is likely to increase among center and right-wing opinion groups as the class-warfare theme is developed more intensively by the communists. At the same time liberals and socialists will become more apprehensive about being outflanked by the communists on popular issues such as wage and price legislation, human rights, anti-militarism, etc. Coalition groups will be more difficult to organize and hold together. Left-wing anti-communist intellectuals now supporting U.S. objectives will become increasingly restless. Except where other factors intervene, European governments will tend to become more cooperative with U.S. but our appeal to the masses will tend to decline.

Reasons:

Largely corollary to Paragraphs 3, 4, and 5.

cc: D/Y - Mr. Morgan
C - Mr. Sherman
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cc: R/E - Mr. Johnson
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P - Mr. Taylor

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10/28/52

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